

ISLAMOPHOBIA DISCOURSE IN INDONESIA MEDIA: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS IN THE NEWS OF 212 DEFEND ISLAM ACTION ON KOMPAS.COM

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Abstrak

Sebagai negara yang struktur sosial, budaya dan politiknya mayoritas diduduki oleh umat Islam, tampaknya Islamofobia tidak mungkin dilakukan oleh satu kelompok Islam terhadap kelompok lain. Namun pada kenyataannya umat Islam di Indonesia terbagi dalam berbagai kelompok kepentingan (madhab) yang saling berinteraksi dan sekaligus memperebutkan ruang untuk aktualisasi dalam sistem politik. Penelitian ini memberikan bukti awal bahwa Islamofobia dapat terjadi di negara-negara yang mayoritas penduduknya beragama Islam dan dapat dipraktikkan oleh sesama kelompok berbasis Islam. Islamophobia dilakukan melalui media massa dan dikonstruksi melalui isu-isu radikalisme, ekstrimisme dan terorisme yang berujung pada pengkhianatan atau penggulingan kekuasaan. Motif konstruksi wacana ini adalah strategi pro power yang bertujuan untuk mengantisipasi gerakan anti kekuasaan yang dilakukan oleh Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa-212 Majelis Ulama Indonesia. Kesimpulan ini diambil berdasarkan analisis wacana kritis (Norman Fairclough, 2010) yang dilakukan dalam empat tahap: fokus pada 'penyimpangan sosial', identifikasi hambatan untuk mengatasi 'penyimpangan sosial', pertimbangan apakah tatanan sosial memerlukan 'ketidakteraturan sosial' ini dan mengidentifikasi metode untuk memecahkan masalah. 'Penyimpangan sosial' yang dimaksud dalam penelitian ini adalah konstruksi Islamofobia dalam pemberitaan Kompas.com pada November 2016 hingga Mei 2017. Kerangka teori yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah Teori Kekuasaan Michel Foucault.

Kata kunci: hegemoni, ideologi, Islamophobia, media, konstruksi medi

Abstract

As a country whose social, cultural and political structure is majorly occupied by Muslims, Islamophobia seems unlikely to be carried out by one Islamic group against another. However, in fact, Muslims in Indonesia are divided into various interest groups (madhab) that interact with each other and at the same time contest over space for actualization in the political system. This research provides preliminary evidence that Islamophobia may occur in countries that are predominantly Muslim and can be practiced by fellow Islam-based groups. Islamophobia is conducted through the mass media and constructed through the issues of radicalism, extremism and terrorism that lead to treason or overthrow of power. The motive for this discourse construction is a pro-power strategy that aims to anticipate anti-power movements carried out by the National Movement for Fatwa Defenders- 212 Indonesian Ulama Council. This conclusion is drawn based on critical discourse analysis (Norman Fairclough, 2010) which was carried out in four stages: focus on 'social irregularities', identification of barriers to addressing 'social irregularities', consideration whether social order requires this 'social irregularity' and identifying methods to solve problems. The 'social irregularity' referred to in this study is the construction of Islamophobia in the news coverage of Kompas.com in November 2016 to May 2017. The theoretical framework used in this study was Michel Foucault's Theories of Power.

Keywords: hegemony, ideology, Islamophobia, media, media construction

INTRODUCTION

In the run-up to the 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election, Indonesia was shocked by a major political event. A piece of speech by the Governor of DKI Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama in the Thousand Islands, which reads, "... So don't trust people, inside your heart you may not be able to vote for me, right. Deceived using surah al Maidah:51..." (BBC.com, 2018) sparked reactions from various

Islamic groups throughout Indonesia.

This speech, that was broadcast on YouTube, was considered a blasphemy against religion. They immediately reported Ahok (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama's nickname) to the police. There were at least 11 similar reports in several Police Offices (Nurhasim, 2016). This reaction became bigger after, on October 11, 2016, the Indonesian Ulama Council issued a fatwa which strengthened the accusation that Ahok had defamed Islam (Detik.com, 2016).

On October 14, 2016, after the Friday Prayers, thousands of people from various Islamic organizations held a demonstration in front of the DKI Jakarta City Hall demanding that the investigation into this blasphemy case be carried out immediately. Rizieq Shihab as the leader of FPI even threatened to take a bigger action and kill Ahok if the government did not respond within 3 weeks (Tempo.co, 2016).

Exactly three weeks later, on November 4, 2016, hundreds of thousands of people coordinated by GNPF-MUI again took action carrying the same demands. However, the government's stance still did not meet the group's expectations. This response, which was considered slow, then triggered even more action on December 2, 2016.

There was an interesting incident during the Defend Islam Action III on December 2, 2016. In various reports in the media, especially on Kompas.com, there were indications of fear from the government that this action would lead to acts of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism which were associated with treason. This indication was first shown by the Police Chief, Tito Karnavian, on November 17, 2016. Tito stated, "If something unwanted happens, our country could collapse." (Kompas.com, 2016). Next, only four hours later, the coordinating minister for Political and Security Affairs, Wiranto, gave a warning, "That the December 2, 2016 action should not interfere with the existence of the state." It did not stop there, on November 19, 2016, Tito Karnavian even explicitly reiterated that the 2 December Action Plan had political overtones.

Ironically, although the action involving millions of Muslims from Indonesia had been peaceful, repetition of Islamophobic terms was still being featured in the media, especially by Kompas.com, at least up to 5 months after the Defend Islam Action III. The news titles displayed by Kompas.com explicitly linked matters related to 212 as part of the discourse on treason, either directly or indirectly. Referring to the criteria set by Ramberg (2004), the news tends to be Islamophobic. In Islamophobia and its consensus to young people further, Ramberg defines Islamophobia as fear or prejudice against Islam, Muslims and things related to them.

This Islamophobic-tone coverage then became a paradox; while a group of people viewed this movement as a new symbol and category in shaping the sociological construction of Muslims in Indonesia which implies the concept of an Islamic society with high solidarity, the principle of compassion, mutual care and protection, willing to sacrifice, full of togetherness, brotherhood, obeying the rules, containing expression of movement, diversity, equality, tolerance between schools (Syahputra, 2018); however, the government's fear of the movement was shown in a vulgar manner in the media.

This is what attracts the attention of researchers, that although the Defend Islam Action III had effectively become the antithesis of the negative accusations made by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, the problem did not end there. Statements that are indicated to contain Islamophobia were still intensively constructed in the news on Kompas.com. This research was conducted to answer the question of how the construction of Islamophobic discourse was built by Kompas.com and what discourses contributed to the production of the Islamophobic discourse.

METHOD

This research is qualitative research with a critical paradigm. The critical paradigm serves as an attitude to provide criticism, social transformation, emancipation, as well as social strengthening. Therefore, the position of researchers in a critical paradigm will very likely be involved in the process of negating real social relations, debunking myths, showing how the world should be (Newman, 2000: 75-87; Denzin, 2000: 163-186). The critical paradigm that uses critical theory reading tools sees that the media is not free from interests, especially those full of interests of the capital owners, the state or other oppressive groups. In this sense, the media is a means of domination and hegemony of society. The logical consequence is that the reality produced by the media is biased or distorted (Supriyadi, 2015).

The critical discourse analysis (CDA) used in this research was Norman Faircough's CDA model in 2010. The steps offered in the 2010 model are: First, the focus of the analysis is on 'social irregularities' in the semiotic aspect. Second, identify barriers to addressing social irregularities. Third, consider whether social order 'causes social irregularities'. Fourth, identify possible ways to overcome these obstacles.

While the analysed research objects that had been selected were the news on Kompas.com as follows:

Figure 1. Research Objects

No.	Date	Time	Title
1.	17/11/2016	14.54 WIB	Police: Stop Demonstrating
2.	18/11/2016	15.26 WIB	Police Chief Asked to Limit the Number of December 2 nd Demonstrators
3.	18/11/2016	19.50 WIB	Wiranto Said December 2 nd Demonstrators to Not Interfere with the Existence of the State
4.	19/11/2016	15.19 WIB	The December 2 nd Action is Political, No Longer About Ahok
5.	28/11/2016	16.41 WIB	Head of BNPT: There is a potential for the December 2 Action to be infiltrated by terrorist groups
6.	02/12/2016	13.03 WIB	Jokowi Thanked the December 2 nd Mass Prayer Participants
7.	02/12/2016	13.21 WIB	Jokowi Shouts Takbir Six Times
8.	02/12/2016	15.36 WIB	Heavy Rain, Jokowi was asked to cancel Friday prayer intentions at Monas
9.	02/12/2016	16.02 WIB	Jokowi's Blue Umbrella Became the Netizen's Talk
10.	02/12/2016	13.27 WIB	The Chairperson of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Assessed Jokowi's Attendance to Cool the Atmosphere of Mass Prayers
11.	02/12/2016	13.49 WIB	Jokowi-JK's Step That Doesn't Recede Due to Rain
12.	02/12/2016	13.59 WIB	Panser Anoa Stands Ready When Jokowi Speaks in Front of Prayer Participants
13.	03/12/2016	13.25 WIB	Said Aqil: Alhamdulillah God Protects Indonesia
14.	03/12/2016	14.42 WIB	PBNU Chairman: The Arrest of Treason Committers Is Not a Backward Democracy
15.	05/05/2017	15.53 WIB	The TNI Commander thinks that the actions of the Muslims are not related to treason, this is what the police said
16.	06/05/2017	17.45 WIB	TNI Commander and Police Chief Had Different Views on Treason, This is What Wiranto Said
17.	09/05/2017	17.29 WIB	Menkumham Expert Staf: If Treason Means Attack, The Country is at Greater Risk
18.	23/05/2017	13.35 WIB	The definition of treason should be limited so that it is not misused
19.	23/05/2017	14.40 WIB	Expert: Definition of treason should not be interpreted at will by the regime
20.	23/05/2017	19.28 WIB	Police Chief Affirmed that the Treason Case Has Strong Evidence

FINDING AND DISCUSSION

Finding

Prior to the Defend Islam Action III on December 2, 2016, the news on Kompas.com indicated the government's fear that this action would lead to acts of radicalism, extremism and terrorism associated with treason against the legitimate government. This indication was first shown by the Chief of Police, Tito Karnavian, on November 18, 2016. At that time, Tito made a statement, "If something unwanted

happens, our country will collapse." Then, just four hours later, the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Wiranto, gave a warning, "That the December 2, 2016 action should not interfere with the existence of the state." It did not stop there, on November 19, 2016, Tito Karnavian even explicitly reiterated that the 2 December Action Plan had political overtones.

The news, which contains a priori statements made by the Chief of Police, has a peculiarity that lies in the position of his discourse which cynically views the movement raised on behalf of Islamic scholars in Indonesia as a serious threat to the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. The main message that the researchers got from the analysis in general was the formation of a narrative of fear of the power of political Islam groups which began to form solidity significantly through street actions in very large numbers. Publishing news articles placed in the national news column Kompas.com indicates its position as news with a high priority scale.

In fact, the "Defend Islam Action III", which was "feared" would lead to acts of terrorism, turned to be peaceful. President Joko Widodo, who previously warned about the destructive dangers of this action, even expressed his high appreciation.

Even though the action had taken place peacefully and in an orderly manner, the news presented by Kompas.com did not actually present the action as an extraordinary achievement. The news that was displayed actually highlighted the heroism of Joko Widodo who suddenly approached the protesters despite the heavy rain pouring down Jakarta. Trivial topics such as 'Jokowi's Blue Umbrella is Trending' were presented as subjects that seemed to be more important than the action itself. It is clear that Kompas.com's efforts to downplay the news of the 212 Defend Islam Action are no bigger than the issue of Jokowi's blue umbrella. Next, Kompas.com placed more news sources from the representation of GNPF-MUI as the organizer of the action using the softnews approach rather than packaging it in the hardnews format.

In the news on Kompas.com dated November 18, 2016, entitled "Police Chief Requests December 2 Demonstrators to be Restricted", there are several uniqueness of news which, when analyzed, contain at least 4 important points, which is the request of the National Police Chief to, so that: (1) the participants of the 212 Defend Islam Action are limited so that they are not ridden by third parties, (2) do not disturb security and order which causes the development of the country to decline, (3) ask the public to act smartly and not lead problems on issues of ethnicity, religion, race and intergroups (SARA), (4) as well as an affirmation from him as the Chief of Police who will resolve the case of blasphemy that was accused of Ahok.

In fact, because he was immersed in the atmosphere of this extraordinary action, Jokowi even shouted the phrase "Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar" 6 times. This expression can be seen clearly as Jokowi's attempt to be part of the action. In this news dated December 2, you can see the statement of President Joko Widodo who openly expressed his appreciation for the mass of the 212 Defend Islam Action which was previously stigmatized as a movement that could potentially threaten the government.

Basically, the 212 Defend Islam Action incident can not be seen as just an incident of mass action demanding legal justice. Although the news published by Kompas.com consistently contains negative stigmatization towards them, Kompas.com's attitude cannot be seen as a cause of the incident.

The events that gave birth to the 212 Defend Islam Action up to seven times, if traced a little back, started when Ahok, who in 2014 was a Gerindra Party cadre, fought his own party's policies to support Joko Widodo's policies as president. As the deputy governor who later became the Governor of DKI Jakarta, the Gerindra Party certainly has great hopes and contributions from Ahok. However, in his journey, Ahok often has different views and attitudes with the party that raised him since he was still the Regent of Bangka Belitung.

It is the incompatibility of Ahok's attitude with the supporting party that then made the Gerindra Party decide to look for an alternative governor who could carry out the party's political mission in the 2017 DKI Gubernatorial Election. However, Ahok's popularity at that time seemed high enough to be defeated easily. The parties who intend to fight Ahok of course have to use extraordinary means to win the contestation.

At the same time, the Democratic Party also nominated its Governor and Vice Governor pairs in the contest. Of course, this made the chances of all the candidates even smaller, because the battle of three pairs was tighter than the fight of two pairs.

When the gubernatorial election started to turn intense, Ahok got into trouble because his statement on the Thousand Islands was commodified by Buni Yani, causing a commotion that led to the birth of the 212 Defend Islam Action up to seven times. This action initially failed to reduce Ahok's popularity in the first round of the election. However, he succeeded in reducing Ahok's electability in the second round. Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno, who were promoted by the Gerindra Party, the National Mandate Party and the Prosperous Justice Party, were quite superior.

The 212 Defend Islam Action and the stigmatization carried out by Kompas.com actually did not need to happen if the basic issues of this problem were quickly identified by each party and resolved immediately. The point of this issue is Ahok's attitude towards the Gerindra Party and vice versa. If at the time the ripples of conflict that had begun to appear on the surface were immediately calmed down by Ahok's resignation, there may never have been an Islamophobic narrative that tried hard to discredit political Islamic groups outside NU and Muhammadiyah that were behind the pro-SBY forces that supported the Agus-Silvy pair and the Pro-Prabowo forces who support Anies-Sandi.

The obstacles that cause this social irregularity are actually a matter of frozen, exclusive political communication, which is exacerbated by the self-confidence of the incumbent which is supported by very high popularity and political electability.

The relationship between Ahok and his supporting parties, which was previously harmonious and then developed into open conflict, became uncontrollable, also triggered by the political egos of each party who considered that the struggle for the position of governor in DKI Jakarta was a more important political goal than harmony.

It seems that the ego of each party trying to seize the political 'wetlands' in Jakarta cannot be renegotiated, so it seems that all of them will make the political battle in the DKI Regional Head Election as a measure of political success at the national level. After all, Jakarta is the capital city of the Republic of Indonesia which becomes a barometer and represents the dynamics of national politics. Naturally, the Gubernatorial Election contestation was very fierce and made it the news spotlight in the Kompas.com national column.

Apart from that, the statement from the PBNU stating that the end of the peaceful demonstration as 'God Has Saved Indonesia' and 'The Arrest of the Perpetrator is Not a Deterioration of Democracy' are other signals that need to be criticized. As we know, Nahdlatul Ulama is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia which has political closeness to the government through the National Awakening Party. Traditionally, NU has always been in a position to support all forms of government policies, especially when they are in one side. When the 212 Defend Islam Action took place, NU had several ministerial representations in Jokowi's cabinet. So of course there is a special reason why Kompas.com asked for a statement from the PBNU and why Said Aqil Siradj made such a statement.

According to the researchers, the reason Kompas.com requested a statement from PBNU was because there was a close relationship between the government, NU and Kompas.com. The closeness of the PBNU can be proven from the representation of its ministers in the cabinet. Meanwhile, the closeness of Kompas.com can be seen from the similarity in their perception of moderate and even liberal Islam. Both NU and Kompas.com have always been consistent with the discourse of moderate Islam and liberal Islam which is practically shown in being open to the issue of pluralism. This moderate and liberal attitude contradicts what is 'accused' of the support groups for the 212 Defend Islam Action which are considered close to radicalism, terrorism and extremism. So of course NU is also 'involved' in the discourse developed by Kompas.com because it has the same interests as both Kompas and the government.

The involvement of NU in the Kompas.com news discourse strengthens the assumption of researchers that in fact there are Islamic forces that are in conflict with fellow Islamic forces during the controversy of the 212 Defend Islam Action. The contestation may have been caused by two factors: first, NU's fear that the 212 Defend Islam Action will deconstruct Jokowi's power, which also includes NU's representation; it could be, secondly, that NU is trying to maintain the existence of its Islamic school called "Islam Nusantara" which is moderate and pluralist from the threat of Islamic schools of thought brought by the groups behind the 212 Defend Islam Action.

If paid attention to, there is a cynical tone uttered by Said Aqil Siradj in the statement " God Has Saved Indonesia ". This sentence shows explicitly that the 212 Defend Islam Action actually has the potential to destroy the integrity of Indonesia, but for some reason, Allah still wants to save Indonesia, which of course is being controlled by the Jokowi government which is being supported by NU and

Kompas.com. This sentence can also be interpreted more broadly as 'Indonesia whose government is supported by NU is proven to be more pleasing to God' so that it does not become deconstructed by other Islamic groups behind the 212 Defend Islam Action.

In addition, although we have seen the entire series of news published by Kompas.com regarding treason, it shows that the term treason itself is still a debate within Jokowi's administration, by legal experts and observers, but NU has shown its position. The news entitled 'Arrest of the Perpetrators of treason is not a decline in democracy' is a reflection of NU's ignorance of anyone who commits treason in the context of Defend Islam Action. We see that NU has carried out unilateral judgments on subjects involved in various Islamic defenses as related to treason. NU's resistance in these two stories is explicit evidence regarding the existence of conflicts among Islamic groups in Indonesia who are involved in the discourse published by Kompas.com.

The main concept used in critical discourse analysis in this study is the concept of 'discourse' formulated by Michael Foucault as a knowledge system that provides information about social technology and governing technology which is a form of power at this time. The critical discourse analysis method introduced by N. Fairclough is inseparable from the inspiration of Foucault's 'discourse' because it can be used to see the relationship of knowledge, power and the truth of language which is a social event. In other words, Foucault wants to show that there is an attempt to structure meaning that determines a certain historical period.

Foucault considered discourse as a social subject that always moves in every social relationship, as well as a conceptual framework and object of knowledge. Discourse is a dependency system that contains the relationship between discourse practices of a society and social institutions. As a result, there will always be an influence from a previous text on new texts produced and the type of discourse practice.

The implications of discourse structure for readers in general can be described as an attempt to form a new reality that does not originate from the speaking subject. But it is a system of thinking that operates in every social practice.

The most important point of Foucault's thought for critical discourse analysis is that discourse is seen as a system of representation, namely rules and practices that produce statements with certain meanings in a historical period. Discourse, according to Foucault, is a way of representing knowledge on a specific topic at a time. Discourse is also a characteristic of politics in which a movement of power occurs. This movement of power will be marked by changes in discourse structure and is considered a mirror of social change.

In the news of Kompas.com related to the 212 Defend Islam Action which was observed and analyzed by researchers, it is very clear how power in the narrow sense, the government, stigmatizes the movement of political Islam groups with Islamophobic nuances. The discourse of radicalism, extremism, terrorism associated with treason was intensely presented by Kompas.com simultaneously or deliberately linked to the Defend Islam Action as a whole.

One of the most visible examples of this negative association is the link between acts of terrorism in the country and the potential for riots against the 212 Defend Islam Action. This indirect link is of course rather difficult to find a logical relationship. It is very likely that the narrative that was deliberately developed by the government contained a defensive ideology of power and tried to exert pressure so that the political Islam groups that were members of the 212 Defend Islam Action did not expand and lead to the articulation of an anti-power ideology.

Efforts to maintain power by the government by building a narrative through Kompas.com have been clearly visible since mid-November 2016 through the news published by Kompas.com. The ideological statements made by both Tito Karnavian as Police Chief and Wiranto as The Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Human Rights vaguely and openly did not want the 212 Defend Islam Action to turn into the antithesis of Joko Widodo's power.

Referring to Michel Foucault's archaeological methodology of knowledge - whose thoughts serve as the epistemological basis for Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis, history should not be understood as a mere documentation of facts or material objects. For Foucault, the history of knowledge should be understood as an artificial layer of 'horizons' or slab of episteme space' of the great narrative hidden behind it. The consequence of using the concept of discourse is that the history of Islamophobia that occurred in Indonesia is actually a clear evidence of the existence of an Islamophobic narrative that integrates itself in historical material objects.

The logical consequence of the application of this concept to the phenomenon of Islamophobia in Indonesia is that Islamophobia may emerge as a reciprocal relation of the power thesis that moves through procedures and mechanisms of power which are formally understood through the media; but it can also be the antithesis of the current pattern of power. The point is, the phenomenon of Islamophobia, whose discourse construction is now articulated in the media, actually does not represent the relationship between one communicator subject to one communicant object (government - media - Islam). However, it contains subjective interest relations that come from all directions. Islamophobia may originate from the impact of contestation between groups in Islam that use the hands of the government to intimidate their political opponents among Muslim groups; but it can also be used as a tool for implementing anti-power strategies.

Since the 9/11 Incident in the United States, terrorism and the war on terror have become the dominant metaphors around the world for coverage of Muslims and Islam, even the news media in China have followed this global trend. The media have created an image of Muslims as a threat, and terms such as 'Arab', 'Muslim' and 'Islam' have become closely associated with 'terror' (Jayyusi, 2012). This also happened in Indonesia. The 212 Defend Islam Action which took place bearing the big name of the National Movement for Fatwa Defenders of the Indonesian Ulema Council is in fact not sufficient as a guarantee that this group will not be free from terrorism and treason.

The case of religious blasphemy committed by Ahok basically started from the issue of differences in political affiliation. Ahok, who was fully supported by the Joko Widodo administration and nationalist-Islamic political parties such as Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Partai Golongan Karya, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, was actually in a vortex of conflict ahead of the 2019 presidential election. The 212 Defend Islam Action III, who was supported by Islamic organizations supporting Prabowo Subianto, who lost the 2014 presidential election and was preparing to face the 2019 presidential election, was targeting victory in the 2017 DKI regional elections by pairing Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Salahudin Uno.

Ahok's position as the incumbent who benefited from high popularity, strong support from political parties, bureaucratic facilities and the flexibility to 'play' budget politics, was a very strong political capital and could not easily be defeated by 'ordinary' means. For this reason, the emergence of the Defend Islam Action III was met with various negative prejudices by the Joko Widodo Government Regime, which openly suspected this movement as a movement that was oriented towards a certain political agenda. A political agenda -which according to Foucault- is anti-power.

Based on the analysis performed on the news above, an interesting finding was noticeable, that the subjects who predominantly delivered statements related to Islamophobia on Kompas.com are considered by researchers as part of the government's political mission. The involvement of subjects with political backgrounds does not necessarily indicate a 'political game' being played by the regime. However, all politicians certainly have political goals by taking advantage of their position as legislative, judiciary and executive. The positions of president and minister are not career positions, but political positions that are temporary in nature. Because of this temporary nature, the positions of president and ministries will become open spaces that are always contested and defended by politicians. Researchers consider the statements issued by Jokowi government officials, Kompas.com, as statements of attitudes regarding their support for their power towards Jokowi's government.

In addition, the Defend Islam Action III, hereinafter referred to as the 212 Defend Islam Action, presented a new map of the Islamic political movement in Indonesia which was previously only dominated by two large groups of social organizations, namely Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The 212 Defend Islam Action showed that the religious authority which was previously established under the control of the two groups, has now been fragmented into a wider area.

In the midst of that fragmentation, Kompas.com, which ideologically has a close relationship with Nahdlatul Ulama as the holder of traditional Islamic authority, was facing the demands of a critical situation related to the actualization of its pluralist ideology which was threatened by the ideology promoted by the 212 Defend Islam Action.

For Foucault, power is truth, so that truth can be imagined as liberation. When ideology promotes ethnocentric interests that are masked under universalism, science reveals truths that mark enlightenment and social progress (Saifuddin, 2005: 383).

From this context, it can be interpreted that the condition of the social structure of the Indonesian people, the majority of which adhere to the *ahlus sunnah wal jamaah* of NU, various forms of justification, marginalization and so on described an effort that is closely related to the struggle for group power. The resulting discourses formed a kind of genealogy of knowledge which contains a right or wrong tendency by one group to another.

Power does not come from the outside, but determines the order, rules, and relationships from within and makes them possible. Power is always related to knowledge that does not come from just one subject, but from the power relations that mark that subject. Power produces knowledge, and knowledge provides power (Sutrisno & Putranto, 2005: 153-160).

If previously we only understood that power was centralized, institutionalized, then by using the Foucault concept we could see that the power play did not come from the Jokowi administration. The role of the media and the power to choose sources and determine what is appropriate and not appropriate for them, has shown a form of power that does not originate from the center and is institutionalized like the government bureaucracy.

The reasons for selecting respondents, that always come from the government and several perspectives from the PBNU, shows the power intentions played by Kompas.com, NU and even the government. This strengthens Foucault's theory which states that power is everywhere with the main characteristic of always explaining itself in a discourse about something else (in this case NU responds to the 212 Defend Islam Action).

From this theoretical explanation, there is a sufficient picture of social practice that has been featured in the Kompas.com news related to the 212 Defend Islam Action. It can be concluded that, Islamophobia which contains prejudice or negative assessment of the 212 Defend Islam Action both before the action took place, when the action was being carried out, and afterwards, is a picture of 'social irregularities' (in Fairclough's term) regarding the existence of self-defense mechanisms from potential anti-power movements exercised by political and ideological opponents of the Jokowi administration, Nahdlatul Ulama and even Kompas.com itself.

The identified social irregularities should be used as a starting point for solving problems that have led to the emergence of the Islamophobic discourse on Kompas.com. Because after all, the 'social irregularities' that can has been revealed through this research must be reprojected as a technical operational step that can help solve the 'irregularity' into an ideal condition in the future. This can be done by carrying out political reconciliation or applying proportional justice from the government to the 212 Defend Islam Action groups which are actually 'living space' in political contestation in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis using Michael Foucault's perspective on power productivity that works through internalization mechanism, researchers found that the Islamophobia construction efforts done by Kompas.com was caused by the pro-power strategy taken by the government and Kompas.com together. The purposes of this pro-power strategy that the undertook are to discredit, marginalize, and corner political Islam, movements whose interests oppose the government and Kompas.com, through texts that they presented.

The closeness of pluralism ideology of Kompas.com and the state's nationalism ideology, which is also the basis of support for Joko Widodo's politics through its supporting political parties, is also another main reason why the collaboration of these two elements are solid in facing the National Movement to Defend Indonesian Ulama Council which initiated the 212 Defend Islam Action.

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